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Introduction
This volume is a collection of papers that were presented at the eigh-
teenth annual East Asia Seminar on Economics (EASE). The EASE 18
was held at Singapore Management University (SMU) on June 22 to 24,
2007. The conference was organized around the theme of financial sector
development in the Asia-Pacific region. The recent changes in Asia’s fi-
nancial sectors—especially in banking and stock markets—have been re-
markable, especially since the Asian currency crisis of 1997 to 1998. There
are a number of diﬀerent elements in recent developments, which can be
roughly categorized into four strands.
First, consider the reforms enacted by the East Asian countries most
aﬀected by the financial crisis (Korea comes immediately to mind). During
and in the aftermath of the crisis, a number of countries introduced re-
forms intended both to open markets to foreign institutions and to liberal-
ize these markets. A number of regulations on financial products and pric-
ing were either loosened or eliminated, and some of these policies are
studied in this volume. A few of these changes were recommended by the
International Monetary Fund during the actual crisis (sometimes quite
forcefully), but most were introduced afterward by governments intent on
improving the quality and robustness of their domestic financial institu-
tions and markets. As a result of the changes in policy, the region as a whole
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has shown remarkable progress and dramatic growth over the past decade,
both on the real side of the economy and (especially) in financial develop-
ment. Still, there have been a number of problems along the way.
Given the size of their respective economies, Japan and China both de-
serve special attention. While Japan avoided a currency crisis in 1997, it did
experience a banking crisis. Despite sizeable injections of capital in both
1998 and 1999, the crisis was prolonged. Conventional wisdom attributes
this mostly to the fact that accounting practices remained extremely opaque
through the period, and the authorities avoided attempts to address this is-
sue. Further, regulatory forbearance seemed self-evident. The regulatory
reform introduced in 2002 finally ended the banking crisis by decisively 
intervening to handle the remaining weak banks. A number of Japanese
banks were allowed to fail, while a number of banks merged (in part to pre-
empt other failures). It was widely suspected at the time that some mergers
were not motivated solely by the desire to make banking operations more
eﬃcient. Instead, it was believed that some banks were simply too big to
fail, resulting in regulatory bias. A number of diﬀerent aspects of these is-
sues are examined in the articles that follow.
A third important factor in the region remains the remarkable growth in
China. China has consistently achieved high economic growth during the
period since the Asian crisis, averaging over 9 percent since 1998. Further,
financial markets in China have been transformed. Chinese markets were
once backward with a heavy regulatory burden; now they are some of the
hottest markets in the world for active trading and associated activities like
initial public oﬀerings (IPOs). During the same period, the Chinese attitude
toward foreign portfolio investment has also changed swiftly, from being es-
sentially completely closed toward a cautious opening. By now, many Chi-
nese firms have experienced IPOs, and the remarkable rises in prices on 
Chinese stock exchanges have created numerous opportunities, along with
some risks. Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) now abound, though it re-
mains unclear whether value is actually created by many of the Chinese
M&As. The recent popularity of M&As has not been restricted to China;
they have also grown in Korea, for example, since the currency crisis as fam-
ily and group ownership has weakened. Cross-border M&As have also be-
come more popular, though they are still less common in East Asia than in
either North America or Europe. Understanding the reasons for this M&A
activity requires careful examination, and this volume makes progress on
this dimension. A related set of questions concerns the development of fi-
nancial centers in Asia, both in the historically important financial activity
hub of Tokyo and also the long-standing rivalry between Shanghai and
Hong Kong. Here, too, the chapters of the volume provide new insights.
A final issue of great importance is the underdeveloped state of financial
technology in Asia. Asian financial and capital markets often lag behind
best-practice commonly seen in New York and London. For instance, there
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is a notable lag in financial innovation in the area of securitization, at least
compared with the United States. Why is this the case? Some consider it to
be a legacy of the bank-based systems that have traditionally been preva-
lent in Asia. Others think that it simply takes time to lure top-notch experts
in financial engineering to the region or to train them domestically.
In this volume, a number of the questions and issues discussed in the pre-
ceding will be elaborated upon and addressed. The collection of papers has
been written with state-of-the-art econometric techniques and modern
data sets from countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Some chapters exploit
a new data set, while others frame policy-relevant questions; some chapters
do both. Enjoy!
I: The Evolving Nature of Regional Stock Markets
The first pair of chapters examines the past, present, and future of Asian
stock markets. McCauley and Chan look forward to the future of two key
financial centers, Hong Kong and Shanghai, by looking back to the past;
Hamao, Hoshi, and Okazaki reflect on the historical development of the
Tokyo Stock Exchange before World War I.
McCauley and Chan predict that China will ease its remaining capital
controls and make the renminbi fully convertible into foreign currencies.
Shortly thereafter, they predict, Shanghai will reemerge as an international
financial center. The prospect of this reemergence has sharpened specula-
tion regarding the relationship of Shanghai and its historical Hong Kong,
the established international financial center that reverted to Chinese sov-
ereignty in 1997. McCauley and Chan argue that Hong Kong will gain
stature as an international financial center when China is more open fi-
nancially, coincident with the return of Shanghai to its traditional role as a
financial center. His thesis is that the development of an onshore interna-
tional financial center (Shanghai) can contribute to the continued develop-
ment of a nearby oﬀshore international financial center (Hong Kong). Thus,
a country (or, more precisely, a federal state) can support more than one fi-
nancial center, an issue that has been much debated in the literature. It also
is interesting to note that McCauley and Chan’s idea is, in some ways, the
inverse of another idea in the literature, namely that financial competition
from oﬀshore can spur the development of an onshore center (as happened
in, e.g., Europe). McCauley and Chan develop their thesis using a century
of historical evidence, while also considering the current range and inten-
sity of financial activity in the two centers. They also provide a more
prospective analysis of the evolution of China’s international balance sheet
and Hong Kong’s share thereof. McCauley and Chan’s method is eclectic
and includes data ranging from rankings based on nose counts of banks,
through multidimensional measures of balance sheets and trading activity,
to regression analysis for future projections.
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Hamao, Hoshi, and Okazaki study the role that the Tokyo Stock Ex-
change (TSE) played before the First World War (WWI) to draw lessons for
more recent events. Recent studies have shown that the Japanese stock
market had a substantial size in the prewar period and played an important
role in financing economic development. However, the initial market capi-
talization of the TSE was not only low but also remained that way for quite
a long period early on in its existence. Though the TSE eventually grew
into one of the two largest stock exchanges in prewar Japan, its growth oc-
curred surprisingly late. Hamao, Hoshi, and Okazaki examine why the
TSE’s development was so slow from its establishment in 1878 through the
1910s and why it then took oﬀ in the late 1910s. The chapter argues that 
the TSE stayed small because low liquidity discouraged new companies
from listing their stocks. In turn, the lack of growth in new listed stocks
meant that liquidity remained low. This equilibrium was broken in 1918
when the TSE changed its listing policy slightly and began to start listing
companies without waiting for their listing applications. The chapter pro-
vides empirical evidence that shows the size of the market did indeed mat-
ter for their listing decisions, at least before 1918. Hamao, Hoshi, and
Okazaki rely on an interesting data set, the listing behavior of cotton spin-
ning firms. Before 1918, the size of TSE aﬀected this relationship, but af-
terward, this relationship disappears. That is, companies found listing their
shares on the stock exchange more attractive if the stock market is more
liquid (in a more liquid market, the underpricing after IPO will be smaller).
That is, the low liquidity and small number of listed companies mutually
reinforced each other until this inferior equilibrium was altered in 1918.
II: Consequences of Financial Development
Asia is not known as being at the leading edge of financial innovation. A
number of chapters in the volume investigate the reasons for this lag and ex-
plore the consequences of policies aimed at spurring financial market de-
velopment. Green, Mariano, Pavlov, and Wachter attempt to find why asset
securitization is not more widespread in Asia. This has been an important
recent development in many financial markets and is a good example of an
area in which Asia is still far technically behind the European and Ameri-
can markets.1 Often financial market development has been hampered by
regulations that persist as a legacy of financial repression. Ito and Chinn
investigate the relationship between financial market development and
macroeconomic current account imbalances. Using data for both devel-
oped and developing countries, they conclude that increases in the size of
financial markets induce a decline in the current account balance in indus-
trial countries, but the reverse for developing countries. Finally, Park pres-
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1. Though it must be said that this gap in Asian financial markets has recently stood it in
good stead, at least from the short-run perspective of early 2008!
ents a case study of policy failure in financial markets. He studies the Ko-
rean deregulation of the mortgage and credit card businesses and the asso-
ciated boom-bust cycle.
Green, Mariano, Pavlov, and Wachter present a compelling argument
for the potential importance of asset securitization in Asia, arguing that it
has the potential to increase Asian financial transparency dramatically.
They provide a conceptual basis for price discovery potential for tradable
market instruments, specifically focusing on mortgage securitization. A
model is presented to explain how misaligned incentives can lead to bank-
generated real estate crashes and macroeconomic instability. They then ex-
amine the performance of Asian banking sectors with respect to securi-
tized real estate returns, thus providing evidence on the importance of
misaligned incentives. They also argue that the addition of mortgage-
backed securities may help to protect markets from the shocks that can
arise from bank-financed mortgage lending. However, in a subtle but pow-
erful comment on the chapter, Lamberte argues that the incentive prob-
lems faced by Asian banks may not be especially important; he argues that
any issues with inappropriate lending can be more eﬀectively dealt with by
improved regulation.
Ito and Chinn are interested in understanding the evolution of global
trade and financial imbalances and investigate the role of budget balances,
financial development, and openness. Financial development—or the lack
thereof—has received considerable attention as a possible contributing
factor to the development of persistent and expanding current account im-
balances that have characterized both the United States and East Asia of
late. Several observers have argued that the depth and sophistication of
American capital markets has caused capital to flow “uphill” from rela-
tively underdeveloped East Asian financial markets toward the United
States. In this chapter, Ito and Chinn extend their previous work by exam-
ining the eﬀect of diﬀerent types and aspects of financial development.
While the theoretical reasons for these linkages are not especially clear, Ito
and Chinn rely on empirics almost entirely. Their data analysis relies on a
cross-country data set that encompasses a sample of nineteen industrial-
ized countries and seventy developing countries during the period from
1986 through 2005. The large amount of variation in their comprehensive
study yields a number of new results. First, they confirm a role for budget
balances in industrial countries when bond markets are incorporated. Sec-
ond, they find that in practice both stock market capitalization and
private-sector credit appear to be important determinants of current ac-
count behavior; countries with more sophisticated financial markets tend
to run current account surpluses. Third, while increases in the size of fi-
nancial markets induce a decline in the current account balance in indus-
trial countries, the reverse is more often the case for developing countries.
Fourth, a greater degree of financial openness is typically associated with
a smaller current account balance in developing countries.
Introduction 5
The V-shaped macroeconomic recovery of Korea from the currency cri-
sis of 1997 is, by now, a well-known story. But much less is known of a
smaller Korean financial crisis that occurred in 2003 as a result of a bust in
the credit card market. Park provides a fascinating case study of this failed
policy reform; he includes an overview of the development of the market,
the subsequent crash, and the associated policy response. Park attributes
the increase in household debt to financial deregulation and a paradigm
shift in the financial industry that began to place more emphasis on reallo-
cation of resources for profits. The consequence of this shift was to intro-
duce bullet or balloon mortgages. Before the currency crisis of 1997, banks
basically lent to big corporations; afterward, banks became eager to lend
to consumers, using residential property as collateral. Deregulation in 1999
removed a ceiling on cash advance services for credit card holders, despite
the absence of adequate credit evaluation systems. Nonbanks—credit card
companies and credit-specialized financial companies—increased their
lending from 14 trillion won in 1999 to 51 trillion won just three years later.
Much of this increase was in cash advances. Credit card delinquency subse-
quently increased sharply, followed by a hard crash with numerous defaults
and bad debts. As credit card companies got intro trouble, there were bail-
outs by the government, with associated moral hazard. Unsurprisingly,
lending declined to just 18 trillion won by 2005.
Park concludes that the Korean credit card crisis is a classic example of
regulatory failure. The deregulation was inappropriately done without the
requisite infrastructure (in this case, a central institution to administer
credit information). The government intervention was timed poorly, and
an abrupt regulatory change in 2002 resulted in a crash of credit card lend-
ing. With more timely and proper policies, many of these diﬃculties could
have been at least alleviated if not averted altogether.
III: Financial Consolidation
Using financial markets to consolidate activity in the real economy is a
topic of perennial interest, but especially so in Asia where such M&As
have historically been rare. However, there has been a noticeable increase
in the pace of financial consolidation of late in Asia, and it is accordingly
appropriate to examine these developments. Three chapters in the volume
deal with M&A activities in Asia. The first chapter by Shen and Lin pro-
vides an overview and analysis of the characteristics of financial consoli-
dation in Asia. The remaining two chapters focus on individual countries,
albeit ones of great size and importance. Wu looks at M&As in China us-
ing an event study approach, while Hosono, Sakai, and Tsuru concentrate
on bank mergers in Japan.
Shen and Lin study the motives that drive Asian financial institutions to
engage in financial consolation; they focus on the interesting case of cross-
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border M&As. They are interested in distinguishing between a number of
commonly discussed motivations for M&As and have a special interest in
determining whether the reasons for M&As changed with the financial cri-
sis of 1997. Five hypotheses are examined, all from an empirical perspec-
tive. These are (1) the gravity hypothesis, (2) the following the client hypothe-
sis, (3) the market opportunity hypothesis, (4) the information cost hypothesis,
and (5) the regulatory restriction hypothesis. While none of the hypotheses
can be directly tested, they gather data on proxies for each of the hypothe-
ses and use these to explain the number of financial M&As in Asia from
1990. It turns out that the proxies that are statistically significant for the pe-
riods both before and after the crisis include (a) the distance between the
countries, (b) the level of gross domestic product (GDP), (c) bilateral trade,
and (d) net foreign direct investment. Distance has a negative impact in
both periods, which tends to support both the gravity hypothesis and infor-
mation cost hypotheses. Gross domestic product has a negative coeﬃcient
in both periods, which is contrary to the gravity hypothesis. On the other
hand, trade is found to have a positive coeﬃcient for both periods, which
supports the following the client hypothesis. Foreign direct investment also
exerts a positive eﬀect, which supports the both information cost and the
following the client hypotheses. Summing up then, the results of Shin and
Lin suggest that both the following the client hypothesis and the regulatory
restriction idea seem reasonable, with no great diﬀerences between the pe-
riods before and after the crisis.
Wu provides the first-ever study of Chinese financial consolidation, a 
notable and worthy achievement. He studies 752 mergers and acquisitions
involving 587 companies traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges in 2005. He uses the event-study method, using a period that
stretches back to fifty days before the M&A to forty days afterward; he also
pays careful attention to accounting information during this window of
time. The analysis indicates that within the event period, the value of most
companies involved in M&As actually increased. He estimates the cumu-
lative abnormal return for acquiring firms and target firms at 1.68 percent
and 2.03 percent, respectively. Wu then examines whether the type, indus-
try, and ownership structure of the companies has an impact on the re-
turns; he also checks the impact of the stock market’s aggregate perfor-
mance. When Wu takes exploits his accounting information within a
longer observation period (four years), he finds that the financial condi-
tions of M&A companies showed a decline in the first year after consoli-
dation, but a subsequent improvement. This is one of the first serious stud-
ies of the newly emerging issue of financial consolidation in the world’s
largest manufacturer, China. The positive results indicate that there is rea-
son to think that even though China’s financial markets are quite young,
they seem to be doing the job of vale creation for which they are intended.
Hosono, Sakai, and Tsuru analyze the merger wave that occurred in the
Introduction 7
Japanese banking sector in the 1990s. Using a comprehensive data set, the
chapter investigates the motives for bank consolidations in Japan between
1990 and 2004, as well as their consequences. The analysis suggests that the
attempts of regulators to stabilize local financial markets through consoli-
dation played an important role in M&As conducted by both regional
banks and credit cooperatives (shinkin). It is interesting to note that these
attempts were not very successful. By way of contrast, the M&As con-
ducted by major banks and regional banks in the early 2000s seem to have
been driven by motives of value maximization. Hosono, Sakai, and Tsuro
test four motives for M&A: (1) improving bank eﬃciency; (2) strengthen-
ing market power; (3) exploiting a policy of too-big-to-fail; and (4) mana-
gerial empire building. Their results suggest that M&As tended to occur
when overall bank health is poor and where the market is less concen-
trated. These results are consistent with the too-big-to-fail and market
power hypotheses, respectively. However, they find no evidence that sup-
ports the managerial motive of empire building.
IV: Reform and Dynamism
The last two chapters in the volume examine the eﬀects of reform on eco-
nomic performance, as measured in the stock market. Sakuragawa and
Watanabe evaluate the eﬀects of the reforms introduced in 2002 by the
Japanese minister for economic and fiscal policy, Heizo Takenaka. The re-
sults demonstrate convincingly that the credibility of economic reforms in-
creased after weak Japanese banks were decisively handled in 2003. Fogel,
Morck, and Yeung examined the impact of low turnover in top companies
on a variety of measures of social justice. They show that a more dynamic
corporate sector is not associated with greater inequality, pollution, injus-
tice, or other social ills.
Sakuragawa and Watanabe study how the stock market evaluated the
Japanese financial reform (the “Takenaka Plan”) using a conventional
event study methodology. They focus on a number of financial events that
occurred in 2002 and 2003, including the announcement of the Takenaka
Plan, the release of the work schedule implementing the financial reforms
the package of monetary policies initiated by the new governor of Bank of
Japan, and the failures of Resona Bank and Ashikaga Bank. Sakuragawa
and Watanabe find that market participants came to believe only gradually
in the government’s intentions to reform bank governance. However, the
credibility of the reforms drastically increased in 2003. Thus, at least some
of the widely held skeptical attitudes toward economic reform seem un-
warranted, at least so far as the financial markets are concerned. Further,
the evidence from the failures of Resona and Ashikaga reveal that bank
shareholders diﬀerentiated between individual banks on the basis of their
financial conditions, rather than cynically lumping all banks together (as
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might be expected if the reforms were not serious).
In earlier work, Fogel, Morck, and Yeung developed a measure of
turnover in a country’s biggest businesses and examined whether this mea-
sure of corporate turnover promotes or hurts economic growth. One might
imagine that a more stable business sector encourages larger research and
development (R&D) and faster growth, simply because monopolist firms
have both the resources to encourage R&D and the incentives to protect
their market power. In fact, though, the results clearly show that greater
turnover in a country’s list of top businesses associated with faster growth
in per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and productivity. A corporate
sector with great turnover is a vibrant one that creates value, while a more
stable business sector also tends to be more stagnant. In low-income coun-
tries, the turnovers are associated with capital accumulation. All this ac-
cords with Schumpeter’s early concept of “creative destruction.”
In this chapter, the authors follow up their earlier analysis and ask
whether countries with more business stability pay the price of lower
growth but also reap the benefits of greater social justice. That is, they ask
whether greater business turnover is systematically associated with a worse
social infrastructure, as manifested in less liberty, fraternity, or equality (to
use the French taxonomy). They use a wide range of indicators of social
well-being, including measures of environmental degradation, health, ed-
ucation, poverty, inequality, and fundamental rights. However, despite a
wide-ranging and ambitious search, they find no evidence that business
stability is associated with better social outcomes.
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